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Lawyers' Rules, Auditors' Rules and the
Psychology of Concealment
Richard W. Paintert
Entrustment of secrets and deceit have interdependent
roles in human relationships. A confidential relationship is
based on trust, but can be used for a deceitful purpose: con-
cealment of information that one of the parties has a duty to
disclose to a third party or to the public. Because confidential
relationships are sometimes used to deceive others, the ethics
of secrecy often clash with the ethics of honesty.1
Exceptions to secrecy are particularly controversial when a
professional is entrusted with the secrets of a client. The legal
and the accounting profession have both struggled with this
problem, and have settled on different answers. Lawyers' rules
favor client secrecy (with a few exceptions), whereas auditors'
rules favor measures designed to detect, to prevent, and if nec-
essary, to disclose client concealment. In situations where a
client is deceiving other persons-whether investors, lenders or
regulators-lawyers and auditors may therefore respond differ-
ently.
This and other differences between the legal and auditing
professions have led the Securities and Exchange Commission's
(SEC) Office of the Chief Accountant (OCA) to take the position
that lawyers and auditors practicing in the same firm cannot
represent the same client at the same time.2 Although the SEC
t Professor of Law, University of Illinois College of Law. I thank Peter
Kostant, John Leubsdorf and Don Langevoort for helpful comments on prior
drafts of this Article, and Jeff Rachlinski for helpful discussions on the rele-
vance of prospect theory to legal ethics.
1. See SISSELA BOK, SECRETS: ON THE ETHIcs OF CONCEALMENT AND
REVELATION 116-35 (1982) (discussing the justifications and limits of confi-
dentiality and asserting that values protected by confidentiality are sometimes
undermined by practices of secrecy); STANLEY CAVELL, THE CLAIM OF REASON
330 (1979) ("A private conversation is one that I do not want others to hear,
not one they necessarily cannot hear.").
2. "OCA would consider a firm's independence from an SEC registrant to
be impaired if that firm also provides legal advice to the registrant or its affili-
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has said that it will look to the accounting industry's Independ-
ence Standards Board (ISB) for leadership on this issue3 the
SEC has made it clear that "the attorney-client relationship is
inconsistent with the independence required of accountants in
reporting to investors."4 The SEC apparently fears that law-
yers' rules will spill over into the auditing side of multidisci-
plinary firms and undermine the independence of auditors
when they decide what information has to be disclosed.5
ates." Letter from Lynn E. Turner, Chief Accountant of the Securities and Ex-
change Commission, to Sherwin P. Simmons, Chair of the American Bar Asso-
ciation Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice (Jan. 22, 1999), available at
<http://www.abanet.org/cpr/turner.html> (citing Rule 2-01(c) of Regulation S-
X, 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-01(c), which states that in determining whether an ac-
countant is independent of a particular person, the SEC "will give appropriate
consideration to all relevant circumstances, including evidence bearing on all
relationships between the accountant and that person or any affiliate thereof,
and will not confine itself to the relationships existing in connection with the
filing of reports with the Commission"); see also SEC, CODIFICATION OF
FINANCIAL REPORTING POLICIES §§ 602.02.e.i, 602.02.e.ii. (stating that one of
the relationships that must be considered in making independence determina-
tions is the relationship created by rendering legal services); Samuel George
Greenspan, Securities Act of 1933 Release No. 6097, 49 S.E.C. Docket 1086,
1099 (Aug. 26, 1991) (finding that an auditing firm's independence from a
registered company is impaired if that firm also provides legal advice to the
registrant); Samuel George Greenspan, Litig. Release No. 12862, 48 S.E.C.
Docket 1690, 1691 (May 23, 1991).
3. See Letter from Lynn E. Turner, supra note 2. She wrote:
[T]he Commission recently recognized the establishment of the Inde-
pendence Standards Board ("ISB") and indicated that, consistent with
its continuing policy of looking to the private sector for leadership in
establishing and improving accounting principles and auditing stan-
dards, the Commission intends to look to the ISB for leadership in es-
tablishing and improving auditor independence regulations applicable
to the audits of the financial statements of Commission registrants.
In a letter dated January 7, 1999, I asked the ISB to consider placing
the topic of legal advisory services on its agenda and suggested that
the ISB consult with your Commission.
Id. (citations omitted).
4. Letter from Harvey J. Goldschmid, SEC General Counsel, Lynn E.
Turner, SEC Chief Accountant, and Richard H. Walker, SEC Director of En-
forcement, to Philip S. Anderson, President of the American Bar Association
(July 12, 1999), available at <http'/www.abanet.org/cpr/goldschmid.html>
("[WIhile the SEC has taken no position on multidisciplinary practice per se,
the SEC has long made clear that its independence rules prohibit an auditor
from certifying the financial statements of a client with which his firm also
has an attorney-client relationship." (citing Charles E. Falk, Accounting and
Auditing Enforcement Act Release No. 34-41424, 69 S.E.C. Docket 1916 (May
19, 1999) (disciplining an attorney-accountant who gave legal advice to an
audit client of another partner in his accounting firm))).
5. The SEC's position, however, appears to be driven in part by public
perception of what would happen in a multidisciplinary firm, rather than what
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This concern also provides additional ammunition to oppo-
nents of multidisciplinary practice who argue that lawyers and
nonlawyer professionals of any kind (not just auditors) should
not practice together, even if they do not represent the same
client simultaneously.6 While the SEC seeks to protect the in-
dependence of auditors, opponents of multidisciplinary practice
fear the legal profession's loss of independence in a world where
"auditing masters" will dictate the rules lawyers play by.7 As
Professor Robert Gordon has told the ABA Multidisciplinary
Practice Commission (the Commission), these arguments are
part of a historical pattern in which the bar invokes "ethical
standards" and the "independent judgment of the legal profes-
sion" to justify rules protecting lawyers from competition.8 The
actually will happen. See id. Goldschmid wrote:
"The SEC requires the filing of audited financial statements in order
to obviate the fear of loss from reliance on inaccurate information,
thereby encouraging public investment in the nation's industries. It
is therefore not enough that financial statements be accurate; the
public must also perceive them as being accurate. Public faith in the
reliability of a corporation's financial statements depends upon the
public perception of the outside auditor as an independent profes-
sional.... If investors were to view the auditor as an advocate for the
corporate client, the value of the audit function itself might well be
lost."
Id. (quoting United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 819 n.15
(1984)). The public's perception of what could happen in a multidisciplinary
firm-and in particular the belief that auditors will not disclose what they are
required to disclose-could in turn be driven by the ABA's refusal to adopt a
clear crime/fraud exception to the lawyer's duty to keep confidences. See infra
notes 25-45 and accompanying text.
6. See, e.g., Hearings Before the Commission on Multidisciplinary Prac-
tice (Feb. 4, 1999) (written remarks of Lawrence J. Fox, Drinker Biddle &
Reath LLP), available at <http'//www.abanet.org/cpr/foxl.html> [hereinafter
Fox Remarks]. Fox and several other witnesses testified in favor of retaining
ethics rules that currently prohibit lawyers from practicing in partnerships
that include nonlawyers. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Rule 5.4(b) (1983) ("A lawyer shall not form a partnership with a nonlawyer if
any of the activities of the partnership consist of the practice of law.").
7. Fox Remarks, supra note 6.
8. Letter from Robert W. Gordon to Sherwin P. Simmons, Chair, Ameri-
can Bar Association Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice (May 21, 1999),
available at <http'//www.abanet.orgcpr/gordon.html>. As Professor Gordon
observes:
Historically, the sad if hardly surprising fact has been that the or-
ganized bar's resistance to new modes of practice, though often
clothed in the high-minded rhetoric of protecting the ethical stan-
dards and independent judgment of the legal profession, has been to a
considerable extent motivated by far less elevated desires to protect
the incomes of lawyers from economic competition or their status from
erosion by groups perceived as interlopers. Given this history of pro-
2000] 1401
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venomousness of objections to multidisciplinary practice that
have been raised before the Commission demonstrates that this
historical pattern is bound to continue. When the Commis-
sion's Report reaches the ABA's House of Delegates, the legal
and auditing professions' differing approaches to secrecy and
concealment thus could become yet one more rationale9 for ex-
cluding the legal profession's most feared competitors, the Big 5
accounting firms, from multidisciplinary practice.
It does not have to be this way. Lawyers and auditors
could practice together in the same firm without representing
the same client simultaneously. Lawyers and auditors in the
same firm could also avoid sharing information about a client
across disciplinary boundaries. Each of these two approaches
would allow lawyers and auditors to practice together, but at a
cost. The first approach sacrifices economies of scale by pro-
hibiting one-stop shopping for legal and auditing services. The
second approach (sometimes referred to as constructing a
"firewall") will still be opposed by the SEC because it does
nothing to assure auditors' independence and because it allows
information to be concealed if kept within the legal side of a
firm. The "firewall" approach also chokes off intra-firm ex-
change of valuable information about a client, in essence mak-
ing both the legal and auditing services less valuable.
There is, however, a third possibility. Clients who choose
to be represented by multidisciplinary firms could waive the se-
crecy rules of the legal profession, allowing their lawyers to
work within the disclosure regime of auditors.'0 Indeed, audi-
tors' rules for responding to fraud and other illegal acts may be
superior to lawyers' rules, not only from the vantage point of
society, but from the vantage point of the client. A client that
wants a good relationship with investors, regulators and lend-
tectionist and factional motives, it is reasonable-without for a mo-
ment questioning the sincerity and good faith of the critics of multi-
disciplinary practice-to treat resistance to organizational innovation
with some skepticism and to ask whether support for such resistance
is more likely to stem from concern for the incomes rather than the
independence of lawyers.
Id.
9. The other often mentioned "ethical" argument against multidisciplin-
ary practice is the two professions' differing rules governing conflicts of inter-
est.
10. But see Fox Remarks, supra note 6. Fox criticized accounting firms for
suggesting that lawyers could share confidential information with auditors
after obtaining a client waiver of confidentiality. See id.; see also infra text
accompanying note 123-24 (quoting, in part, Fox's remarks).
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ers may decide ex ante that secrets should not be kept by law-
yers whom it hires to work on public offerings, mergers and
similar transactions." The client might prefer rules that bind
these lawyers to disclose crime or fraud to regulators or af-
fected third parties 12 or to its own board of directors, 13 and by
similar reasoning, the client might prefer that at least some of
its lawyers be required to share information with its auditors.'
4
Disclosure by lawyers to auditors would in turn subject the in-
formation to auditors' disclosure rules with respect to the out-
side world.' 5 Disclosure to auditors would also discourage an
organizational client's officers and other agents from using
lawyer secrecy to conceal their own misdeeds from sharehold-
ers, and even from the client's own directors, 16 at the client's
expense.
Furthermore, auditors' rules may protect the client more
effectively than lawyers' rules from risk preferring decisions on
a variety of levels, whether by lawyers and auditors themselves
or by the client's officers and employees. Psychological re-
11. See generally Richard W. Painter, Toward a Market for Lawyer Disclo-
sure Services: In Search of Optimal Whistleblowing Rules, 63 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 221 (1995) (proposing a voluntary regime in which lawyers can decide ex
ante whether they will disclose client crime or fraud, and suggesting that cli-
ents can then hire lawyers who have chosen the rules they prefer while inves-
tors, regulators and other third parties can in turn adjust their dealings with
both the clients and lawyers accordingly).
12. See generally id.
13. See Richard W. Painter & Jennifer E. Duggan, Lawyer Disclosure of
Corporate Fraud: Establishing a Firm Foundation, 50 SMU L. REV. 225, 244-
55 (1996) (proposing that SEC registrants specify in their articles or bylaws
the body to whom lawyers should report prospective crime or fraud, with the
default rule being that lawyers should refer the matter to a higher authority
within the registrant up to its board of directors).
14. See generally Peter C. Kostant, Breeding Better Watchdogs: Multidis-
ciplinary Partnerships in Corporate Legal Practice, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1213
(2000) (proposing that lawyers and auditors within the same firm be allowed
to represent the same client simultaneously, provided the lawyers agree to
share information with the accountants, who in turn would share information
with the client's audit committee).
15. Nowhere do the disclosure rules binding auditors, see infra text ac-
companying notes 54-63, provide for an exception because the auditors learned
the relevant information from lawyers.
16. The ABA has so far declined to require that an organizational client's
lawyers report prospective illegal acts to the client's board of directors. See
infra text accompanying notes 31, 41 (discussing the ABA's interpretation of
Model Rule 1.13 and the Commission's rejection of proposed amendments to




search in prospect theory17 suggests that concealment of infor-
mation could be related to individuals' biased assessments of
the legal and business risks of concealment. Knowing this, cli-
ents might want to protect themselves by hiring professionals
who are bound by rules that constrain decisional choices in
situations where the client and its professionals are most likely
to engage in risk preferring behavior. If so, auditors' rules for
disclosure of client fraud and illegal acts may be superior to
lawyers' rules.
Part I of this Article briefly discusses the rules that govern
the legal profession in a client crime or fraud situation, as well
as recent proposals to change these rules.'8 Part II briefly dis-
cusses the rules of the auditing profession, which have been
codified in the 1995 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act. 19
Because this author has already written on the economic ad-
vantages of ex ante waiver of lawyer secrecy by corporate cli-
ents within a rational actor framework,20 Part III moves on to
prospect theory's elucidation of the psychological side of con-
cealment.21 Part IV discusses how professionals and organiza-
tional clients can respond to the psychology of concealment, and
why auditors' rules may be superior to lawyers' rules in a client
crime or fraud situation. Part V discusses ways in which mul-
tidisciplinary practice firms could also respond to the psychol-
ogy of concealment by obtaining ex ante client waiver of law-
yers' secrecy rules. Part V then compares the
recommendations of the Commission and the position of the
SEC with the alternative response of client waiver, which has
already been criticized by opponents of multidisciplinary prac-
17. See, for example, Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Advances in
Prospect Theory: Cumulative Representation of Uncertainty, 5 J. RISK &
UNcERTAINTY 297 (1992) and other texts discussed infra text accompanying
notes 67-79.
18. The philosophical underpinnings of the different rules that shape law-
yers' and auditors' responses to client crime or fraud, as well as the profes-
sional conduct codes and case law in which those rules have evolved, are dis-
cussed more extensively in Kostant, supra note 14. See also Painter &
Duggan, supra note 13, at 234-44 (comparing vague whistleblowing rules for
lawyers with the clearer and more disclosure-oriented rules for auditors).
19. H.R. 1058, 104th Cong. (1995), codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78a (1996).
20. See generally, Painter, supra note 11.
21. See generally Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and
Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998) (arguing that human behavior is not
determined solely by rational self-interest); Christine Jolls et al., Theories and
Tropes: A Reply to Posner and Kelman, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1593, 1599 (1998)
(same) [hereinafter Jolls et al., Theories and Tropes].
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tice in testimony before the Commission. The most salient
criticism of the waiver solution is that it is inconsistent with
the values of the legal profession.22 Another criticism of any
arrangement in which lawyers and auditors in the same firm
represent the same client is that the auditors' independence
could be sacrificed by the firm's receipt of compensation for le-
gal services. This Article concludes, however, that ex ante
waiver of confidentiality by a sophisticated client actually
strengthens the values of the legal profession by alleviating
tension between professional responsibility rules prohibiting
disclosure of client confidences 23 and other rules prohibiting
lawyer assistance of client crime or fraud.24 This Article also
concludes that, assuming waiver is obtained, incentives within
a multidisciplinary firm to disclose information about a client's
crime or fraud should more than offset compensation related
incentives not to disclose.
I. LAWYERS' RULES
Courts, bar associations and federal regulators disagree
strongly over what a lawyer should do when an organizational
client is about to commit, or is already committing,25 a crime or
fraud.26 Differing language in the ABA Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct and the earlier ABA Model Code of Professional
Responsibility reflect this uncertainty,27 as do the various rules
22. See, e.g., Fox Remarks, supra note 6.
23. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1983).
24. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2(d)
(1983).
25. Ethics rules ordinarily distinguish between the situation where a cli-
ent has already committed a crime or fraud (in which case disclosure is gener-
ally prohibited) and the situation where a client is going to commit a future
crime or fraud (in which case jurisdictions differ with respect to whether dis-
closure is prohibited, permitted or required). This distinction is not so impor-
tant for the problem addressed in this Article-financial fraud by a reporting
company-because failure to disclose a material illegal act that has already
occurred is usually itself a violation of the securities laws.
26. See Susan P. Koniak, When Courts Refuse to Frame the Law and Oth-
ers Frame It to Their Will., 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1075, 1100 (1993).
27. Compare MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-
101(C) (1980) (providing that "[a] lawyer may reveal: ... (3) the intention of
his client to commit a crime and the information necessary to prevent the
crime"), with MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1983) (pro-
viding that disclosure of confidential client information is permitted only to




that have been adopted by the states.28
While the ABA's Model Rules prohibit lawyer participation
in client crime or fraud,29 they set forth vague standards on
what a lawyer should do affirmatively when confronted with
crime or fraud, particularly within an organizational client.
The lawyer must act in the "best interests of the organizational
client,"30 but the ABA has consistently refused to affirm that a
lawyer for an organization must report illegal acts by the or-
ganization's agents to the board of directors or other highest
authority in the organization.
31
Federal administrative agencies, such as the Office of
Thrift Supervision (OTS) and the SEC, have sought to impose
rules on lawyers that "practice before"32 the agency (a term that
is often loosely construed to apply to any lawyer advising a cli-
28. Most states have not adopted the highly restrictive Model Rule 1.6.
29. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2(d) (1983).
The rule states:
A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in
conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent, but a lawyer
may discuss the legal consequences of any proposed course of conduct
with a client and may counsel or assist a client to make a good faith
effort to determine the validity, scope, meaning or application of the
law.
Id.
30. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.13(b)
(1983). The rule states in part:
[The lawyer] shall proceed as is reasonably necessary in the best in-
terest of the organization. In determining how to proceed, the lawyer
shall give due consideration to the seriousness of the violation and its
consequences, the scope and nature of the lawyer's representation,
the responsibility in the organization and the apparent motivation of
the person involved, the policies of the organization concerning such
matters and any other relevant considerations.
Id. Model Rule 1.13 states further that "referring the matter to higher
authority in the organization" is one of several measures that a lawyer may
take when a fraud or illegal act has been committed by an agent of a client,
but the rule does not require such a report and the ABA has been very critical
of any attempt by regulators to infer such an obligation. MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.13(b)(3) (1983).
31. See AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, WORKING GROUP ON LAWYERS'
REPRESENTATION OF REGULATED CLIENTS REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF
DELEGATES 6-7 (1993) (complaining that, among the Office of Thrift Supervi-
sion's "novel theories of professional responsibility" in its charges against
Kaye, Scholer, was the notion that a lawyer has an obligation to report mis-
conduct to superiors, going "all the way to the client's board of directors")
[hereinafter REGULATED CLIENTS REPORT].
32. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 201.102(e) (1999) (providing that the SEC may
temporarily or permanently deny to any person the privilege of practicing be-
fore the Commission after notice and hearing).
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ent on regulatory issues). Agency rules, however, provoke op-
position from the bar,33 particularly when they are construed
broadly against lawyers. 34 As a result, agencies sometimes lack
the political will to consistently enforce these rules. The OTS,
for example, proposed in the early 1990s to standardize, in a
"revised attorney letter," the representations made to it by at-
torneys on behalf of their clients, 35 but the OTS letter was sub-
sequently rescinded.
36
The ABA has urged attorneys to comply with voluntary
standards for lawyer opinion writing,37 and these standards
33. See REGULATED CLIENTS REPORT, supra note 31, at 2 (complaining
about various "novel theories of professional responsibility" articulated by the
Office of Thrift Supervision in the Kaye, Scholer matter); ABA Report to the
House of Delegates, Section on Corporation, Banking and Business Law Rec-
ommendation, 31 BUS. LAW. 544, 545 (1975) (deriding "efforts by the govern-
ment to impose responsibility upon lawyers to assure the quality of their cli-
ents' compliance with the law...").
34. See Painter & Duggan, supra note 13, at 244-55 (discussing how the
SEC, in construing the terms "improper professional conduct" in Rule 102(e),
has articulated ambiguous standards for both lawyers and accountants, and
how these standards have been arbitrarily applied in Rule 102(e) case law).
35. From July 1994 to August 1995, the OTS required a depository insti-
tution to send to its attorney a "revised attorney letter" asking the lawyer to
confirm that the attorney would respond in accordance with applicable rules of
professional conduct to any issue that might arise in connection with conflicts
of interest, the institution's compliance with laws or regulations, and fiduciary
duties or principles of safety and soundness. The attorney was not legally re-
quired to agree to the letter's terms, but the letter specifically provided that if
the attorney did not provide the requested confirmations, the examiner would
take this failure into account in its evaluation of the institution. See Carolyn
B. Lieberman et al., Professional Conduct in Representing a Regulated Indus-
try: The OTS Experience, 35 S. TEX. L. REV. 607, 632-34 (1994); Revised Attor-
ney Letter, OTS Transmittal No. 113, at 3 (June 24, 1994), reprinted in ABA
Ad Hoc Committee on OTS Attorney Inquiry Letters, Guidance for Lawyers
Responding to the OTS Revised Attorney Letter, 50 BUS. LAW. 607, 629 (1995).
36. The OTS Revised Attorney Letter was withdrawn after "three years of
wrangling with the bar about requiring attorneys to 'confirm' their agreement
with certain OTS views of professional responsibility," and after the OTS de-
cided it was cheaper and easier to obtain the required information directly
from the depository institutions. OTS Cancels "Attorney Letter" Citing Exam-
iners' Lack of Need, 4 BANK LAW. LIABILITY (LRP Publications) Oct. 1995.
37. See ABA Committee on Legal Opinions, Third-Party Legal Opinion
Report, Including the Legal Opinion Accord, of the Section of Business Law,
American Bar Association, 47 BUS. LAW. 167, 169, 176 (1991) [hereinafter
ABA Opinion Report and Accord] (sometimes referred to as the "Silverado Ac-
cord"). By contrast with the approach of the OTS Revised Attorney Letter, the
ABA used voluntary mechanisms when it sought to standardize opinion lan-
guage and procedures. While a legal opinion does not have to conform to the
guidelines set forth in the Silverado Accord, the Accord defines preferred
opinion writing practice, and an opinion letter may incorporate provisions of
140720001
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help prevent opinions from being misused (for example, when a
literally accurate opinion is rendered on the basis of dubious
factual assumptions or is used by the client to further an illegal
or fraudulent objective). The ABA, however, also looks with
disfavor upon opinions containing "negative assurances" about
a client's overall conduct (for example, it is generally considered
inappropriate to request an opinion from a lawyer stating that
his client is in compliance with all applicable laws). 38
This author has suggested to the ABA's Ethics 2000 Com-
mission, a committee charged with proposing revisions to the
Model Rules, a compromise approach of imposing default rules
on lawyers instead of the immutable rules that regulators have
sought to impose. For example, the Model Rules could require
that a corporation's lawyer report fraud and other illegal acts to
the corporation's full board of directors or to any alternative
body designated to receive such reports under the client's char-
ter or articles of organization. 39 Clients thus could opt out of
the default rule requiring that the report be made to the board
of directors by inserting in their articles of organization a pro-
vision requiring reports of illegal acts to be made to a specific
committee of the board (for example a compliance committee)
or to a particular officer.40 The ABA Ethics 2000 Commission,
however, appears to have rejected this proposal in favor of the
ambiguity of the status quo.4
1
Lawyer whistleblowing to authorities outside a client's or-
ganizational structure is even more controversial. Model Rule
1.6 forbids disclosure, unless life or serious bodily injury are at
risk, or unless the client is in a dispute with the lawyer (for ex-
ample, in a malpractice suit or a dispute over the lawyer's
the Accord by reference. See id. at 170.
38. See id. at 228.
39. See Richard W. Painter, Proposal to the ABA Ethics 2000 Commission
for the Amendment of Model Rule 1.13 (May 1998) (on file with author)
n(urging that Model Rule 1.13 require a lawyer to report prospective illegal
acts to the client's fifll board of directors unless an alternative body to receive
such a report is specified in the client's articles of organization).
40. Corporations could contract out of the default rule by specifying
ex ante (before the illegal conduct occurs) in their articles of incorporation the
person or committee to whom such disclosure by the lawyer should be made
instead of to the full board. See id.
41. The Ethics 2000 Commission has not recommended any revisions to
Model Rule 1.13. See Ethics 2000 Commission, Model Rule 1.13-Reporter's
Explanation of Changes (Feb. 21, 2000), available at <http'//www.abanet.org
cpr/rulell3memo.html> (explaining that the Commission is not recommend-
ing any substantive changes to the rule or its comments).
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fee).42 Model Rule 1.6 is unclear about whether a client can, by
prior agreement with its lawyer, prospectively waive confiden-
tiality in the crime or fraud context, so the lawyer may later
disclose if the need should arise. The rule preferred in most
states, however, is the earlier Model Code rule which permits,
but does not require, a lawyer to disclose client fraud.43 A law-
yer practicing in this optional disclosure regime could theoreti-
cally announce ex ante that the lawyer intends to disclose in-
formation outside the client's organization if necessary to
prevent a prospective or ongoing crime or fraud. 4 This policy
could then be communicated not only to the lawyer's client, but
to third parties, who-if they trust the lawyer to disclose-
might look more favorably on both the lawyer and the client as
a result.45 So far, however, few if any lawyers have tried this ap-
proach and the ABA appears to be in no hurry to encourage
them to do so.
A lawyer, however, may with a client's consent disclose
material facts about the client's conduct to assist with an ex-
ternal evaluation of the client,46 such as when auditors request
42. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1983).
43. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(C)
(1980). Only two states, New Jersey and Florida, require disclosure of all or
most client crimes. See N.J. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(1)
(1994) (requiring a lawyer to disclose information necessary to prevent a client
"from committing a criminal, illegal or fraudulent act that the lawyer rea-
sonably believes is likely to result in death or substantial bodily harm or sub-
stantial injury to the financial interest or property of another"); FLA. RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4-1.6(b)(1)(2) (2000) (requiring a lawyer to dis-
close client intent to commit a crime). Some other states, such as Illinois, re-
quire disclosure to prevent death or serious bodily harm. See ILL. RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b) (1999) ("A lawyer shall reveal informa-
tion about a client to the extent it appears necessary to prevent the client from
committing an act that would result in death or serious bodily harm."). But
see Balla v. Gambro, Inc., 584 N.E.2d 104, 111, 113 (Ill. 1991) (holding that
corporation could, under the employment-at-will doctrine, fire its general
counsel for telling its President that he would "do whatever was necessary to
stop the sale" of dialyzers that were dangerous and did not comply with FDA
regulations).
44. See Painter, supra note 11, at 267-74.
45. See id. (suggesting that the chosen rule would signal to third parties-
such as regulators, transaction participants and investors-the probability
that lawyers will blow the whistle should client misconduct occur; that ra-
tional third parties would adjust their expectations accordingly and sometimes
reward clients whose lawyers have chosen expansive whistleblowing rules;
and that rational clients would choose their lawyers in anticipation of third-
party responses).
46. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 2.3 (1983) (stat-
ing that a lawyer may, with a client's consent, "undertake an evaluation of a
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information, usually in the form of a letter.47 The lawyer can
refuse to provide the information, and must refuse if the client
so requests,48 but this would likely lead the auditors to resign.
The lawyer, furthermore, probably must also resign if the client
refuses to abide by the lawyer's advice to disclose.4 9 This audit
letter procedure, however, can be awkward and time consum-
ing, delaying disclosure of important information. Further-
more, because lawyers who do not share financial gains and
losses with auditors are probably unaffected by auditors' liabil-
ity exposure under Section 11 of the 1933 Act50 and other provi-
sions of the securities laws, they may not worry so much about
the consequences of a client concealing information from its
auditors.51 Unscrupulous lawyers may even collude with cli-
ents to keep information from their auditors.
matter affecting a client for the use of someone other than the client"); id. cmt.
1 (stating that the "evaluation may be performed at the client's direction but
for the primary purpose of establishing information for the benefit of third
parties"). But see id. cmt. 3 (stating that, when the lawyer is retained by the
person whose affairs are being examined, "the general rules concerning loyalty
to client and preservation of confidences apply").
47. See American Inst. of Certified Public Accountants, Statement on
Auditing Standards Number Twelve §§ 337.01, 337.08 (1976) (stating that
"the letter [of audit inquiry] to the client's lawyer is the auditor's primary
means of obtaining corroboration of the information furnished by management
concerning litigation, claims and assessments"); id. § 337.05 (naming items
that should be included in the letter, including a list prepared by the client's
management or lawyer that "describes and evaluates pending or threatened
litigation," and another list that evaluates unasserted claims).
48. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 2.3 (1983) (re-
quiring client consent). One concern that clients might have is that lawyer
responses to audit letters can "strip" a client of the protection of the attorney-
client privilege and work product doctrine. See generally American Bar Ass'n,
Statement of Policy Regarding Lawyers' Responses to Auditors' Requests for
Information, 31 BUS. LAW. 1709 (1976); James J. Fuld, Lawyers' Responses to
Auditors-Some Practical Aspects, 44 BUS. LAW. 159 (1988); Arthur B.
Hooker, Lawyers' Responses to Audit Inquiries and the Attorney-Client Privi-
lege, 35 BUS. LAW. 1021 (1980).
49. See American Bar Ass'n, supra note 48, at 1725 (stating that the law-
yer should withdraw from representing the client in the event that the client
rejects the lawyer's advice to disclose).
50. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (Supp. IV 1998) (listing accountants, but not law-
yers, among the persons who can be held liable for material misstatements or
omissions in a registration statement).
51. Although auditors might plead ignorance, Section 11 requires the




The confidentiality obligations of accountants are in many
respects similar to those of lawyers. Accountants, including ac-
countants acting as auditors, must keep the confidences of their
clients.52 Although courts have generally not recognized an ac-
countant-client privilege, a privilege has in some instances
been created by statute.53 When, however, accountants per-
form the auditing function, their obligation to disclose illegal
acts of their clients, including violations of securities disclosure
laws, is clear.
Section 10A of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act,54 as
added by Section 301 of the Private Securities Litigation Re-
form Act of 1995, 55 specifies procedures that auditors must fol-
low to detect and disclose fraud and other illegal acts (including
violations of the securities laws) by a registered company.
Each audit must include procedures designed to discover illegal
acts that would have a material effect on financial statements
and to identify related party transactions:
Each audit required pursuant to this title of the financial statements
of an issuer... shall include.., procedures designed to provide rea-
sonable assurance of detecting illegal acts that would have a direct
and material effect on the determination of financial statement
amounts ... [and] procedures designed to identify related party
transactions that are material to the financial statements ... 56
Furthermore, once an auditor "detects or otherwise becomes
aware of information indicating that an illegal act... has or
may have occurred," the auditor is required to determine
"whether it is likely that an illegal act has occurred."57 If so,
52. American Inst. of Certified Public Accountants & Nat'l Ass'n of State
Bds. of Accountancy, Uniform Accountancy Act and Uniform Accountancy
Rules (visited Mar. 17, 2000) <http'//ftp.aicpa.org/public/download/states/naa/
finalll.doc>. A Certified Public Accountant (CPA) "shall not voluntarily dis-
close information communicated to [the CPA] by the client relating to and in
connection with services rendered to the client." Id. "A member in public
practice shall not disclose any confidential client information without the spe-
cific consent of the client." American Inst. of Certified Public Accountants,
AICPA Code of Professional Conduct ET Section 301 (visited Mar. 17, 2000)
<http//www.aicpa.org>.
53. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 7525, (added by Internal Revenue Service Restruc-
turing and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-206, § 3411, 112 Stat. 206,
750).
54. 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1 (Supp. IV 1998).
55. See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-
67, § 301, 109 Stat. 737, 762 (1995).
56. Id.
57. Id. § 301, 109 Stat. at 763.
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the auditor is also required to determine the effect of the illegal
act on the corporation's financial statements, as well as to re-
port this information to the appropriate level of management
unless the illegal act is clearly inconsequential. 58 If manage-
ment does not remedy the problem, the auditor must then re-
port the information to the company's full board of directors,
and the directors must report the information to the SEC
within one day. If the board of directors does not so report to
the SEC, the auditor must make the report.
59
Section 1OA(d) provides that the SEC may sanction an
auditor for violating these provisions by imposing a cease and
desist order under Section 21C of the 1934 Act or by imposing
"'a civil penalty against the independent public accountant and
any other person that the Commission finds was a cause of
such violation" under the standards in Section 2lB.60 Although
the Act specifically provides that there shall be no private right
of action for violating Section 10A,61 compliance with Section
1OA could be very relevant to an auditor's defense in suits
brought under existing causes of action in the securities laws.
Despite the threat of sanctions and possibly even enhanced ex-
posure to civil liability for violations of Section 10A, the audit-
ing profession supported its enactment, 62 in part because Sec-
58. See id.
59. See id. As The Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Con-
ference for the 1995 Reform Act explains:
This [Conference Report] provision requires independent public ac-
countants to adopt certain procedures in connection with their audits
and to inform the SEC of illegal acts of their auditing clients. These
requirements should be carried out in accordance with generally ac-
cepted auditing standards for audits of SEC registrants-as modified
from time to time by the Commission--on the detection of illegal acts,
related party transactions and relationships, and evaluation of an is-
suer's ability to continue as a going concern.
S. REP. No. 104-98, at 23, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 702.
60. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67,
§ 301, 109 Stat. 737, 764 (1995).
61. "Nothing in this Act... shall be deemed to create or ratify any private
right of action." Id.
62. The AICPA said that the measure "should bolster public confidence in
the nation's financial reporting system by requiring auditors to provide earlier
public notification of possible misconduct." Amended Fraud Detection Bill Ap-
proved by House Subcommittee, 25 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 400 (Mar. 19,
1993). Representative Edward Markey (D-Mass) commented that the bill also
enjoyed the support of the Big Six accounting firms. Kerry Introduces Finan-
cial Fraud Bill with Safe Harbor for Whistleblowers, 25 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep.
(BNA) 500 (Apr. 2, 1993). It should be noted that an important quid pro quo
for auditors in the 1995 Reform Act was the proportionate liability provision in
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tion 10A corresponded closely with the profession's existing
rules for reporting illegal acts and fraud.
63
III. PROSPECT THEORY AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
CONCEALMENT
Psychological research identifies cognitive biases that
cause decision-makers to make choices differently, and not al-
ways "rationally." Psychologists thus recognize that the same
prototype-whether Holmes's "bad man"6 or Posner's "rational
actor"65-may not define the typical human response to every
given situation.66 Different characteristics of the human psy-
che (greed, fear, jealousy, guilt, and self-esteem to name a few)
shape human decision-making at different times and in differ-
ent situations. When these characteristics create cognitive bi-
ases that are widespread and predictable, psychology offers a
powerful tool to predict how human beings, including lawyers
and their clients, will respond to given situations and how laws,
including rules of professional conduct, can alter these re-
sponses.
Prospect theory posits that decision-makers are risk averse
when deciding between two decisions that result in a gain, but
section 201 of the Act. This provision eliminated joint and several liability in
securities fraud litigation except for defendants who engage in knowing fraud.
63. See AICPA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 301 (Interpreta-
tion) (American Inst. of Cert. Pub. Accountants 1995). It states:
The prohibition against disclosure of confidential information ob-
tained in the course of a professional engagement does not apply to
disclosure of such information when required to properly discharge
the member's responsibility according to the profession's standards.
The prohibition would not apply, for example, to disclosure, as re-
quired by Section 561 of the Statement on Auditing Standards No. 1
[AU section 561], of subsequent discovery of facts existing at the date
of the auditor's report which would have affected the auditor's report
had he been aware of such facts.
Id.
64. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV.
457, 459 (1897).
65. See Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and
the Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1551, 1556-57 (1998) (assuming irrational smokers
respond randomly to an increase in the tax on cigarettes, "[i]f the distribution
of these random behaviors has the same mean as the rational smokers' reac-
tion to the tax, the effect of the tax on the quantity demanded of cigarettes will
be identical to what it would be if all cigarette consumers were rational").
66. See Jolls et al., Theories and Tropes, supra note 21, at 1599 (1998)
("[Judge Posner's argument] is a common response to behavioral economics,
and conceivably it could be true; but there is absolutely no reason to think it
is, and (as is usually the case) none is offered by the source of the criticism.").
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risk preferring when deciding between two decisions that result
in a loss.6 7 A person confronted with a choice between (a) re-
ceiving $10 and (b) a 1 in 2 chance of receiving $20 is thus more
likely to take the $10, whereas someone choosing between (a) a
sure $10 loss and (b) a 1 in 2 chance of suffering a $20 loss is
more likely to take his chances. Numerous psychological stud-
ies have confirmed this bias, showing that the nature of a deci-
sion, or the "frame" that casts it as a choice between gains or a
choice between losses, is a critical determinant of decisional
outcomes.68 Expertise in the subject matter of a decision does
not mitigate this framing effect,69 and this bias influences
judgments (or evaluations) as well as decisions.
70
Prospect theory has been used by Professor Rachlinski to
develop a framing theory of litigation7' positing that plaintiffs
are risk averse when weighing settlement offers against taking
their chances in litigation for even larger potential gains,
whereas defendants are risk preferring when weighing the cer-
tain costs of a settlement offer against taking their chances in
litigation that could result in even larger potential losses.
72
67. See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, Values and Frames,
39 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 341, 342-44 (1984); Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky,
Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263,
263 (1979); Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 17, at 297; see also John C. Her-
shey & Paul J.H. Schoemaker, Risk Taking and Problem Context in the Do-
main of Losses: An Expected Utility Analysis, 47 J. RISK & INS. 111 (1980) (of-
fering additional empirical support for Kahneman & Tversky's theory).
68. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Gains, Losses, and the Psychology of Litiga-
tion, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 113, 124 (1996) (citing over a dozen studies confirming
this cognitive bias in monetary gambles, life-threatening choices, purchasing
decisions and other situations).
69. See id. at 124-25.
70. See id. at 125 n.52 (citing studies analyzing the judged incidence of
cheating and the judged quality of the taste of hamburger meat).
71. See generally Chris Guthrie, Better Settle Than Sorry: The Regret
Aversion Theory of Litigation Behavior, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 43 (discussing
Rachlinski's framing theory of litigation); Rachlinski, supra note 68.
72. See Rachlinksi, supra note 68, at 128-30 (discussing framing of deci-
sions in litigation). This pattern seems to reverse itself when decision-makers
overestimate the probability that low probability (1 in 10 or less) gains or
losses will occur. Tversky and Kahneman thus observed risk seeking by sub-
jects faced with low probability gains and risk aversion by subjects faced with
low probability losses. See Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 17, at 306.
Overestimation of the likelihood of very low probability events perhaps ex-
plains in part why consumers purchase both lottery tickets (risk seeking) and
insurance (risk aversion) at the same time. See Chris Guthrie, Framing Frivo-
lous Litigation: A Psychological Theory, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 163 (2000) (ex-
plaining plaintiffs' risk preferring behavior in litigation that has a low prob-
ability of success). By contrast, lawyers who file suits with moderate to high
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Professor Rachlinski demonstrated the robustness of this the-
ory in three studies, including two surveys of Cornell Law
School students73 and a comparison of rejected settlement of-
fers with litigation outcomes in 722 northern California state
court cases that proceeded to trial.74 All three studies pointed
in the same direction: "People facing potential losses from liti-
gation make riskier choices than people facing potential
gains."75
This effect is observed not only in litigation settlement de-
cisions, but in ethical risk taking as well. Psychological studies
have demonstrated that taxpayers who owe money are more
probability of success tend to represent risk averse plaintiffs who have diffi-
culty persuading risk preferring defendants to settle. See id. at 182; Rachlin-
ski, supra note 68, at 128-30. Transactional lawyers also are usually retained
in situations in which there is a moderate or high probability of gains (low
probability gains would not justify their fee), and less often when there is a
moderate or high probability of losses such as a corporate workout. Conceal-
ment by a client of material information from its auditors in violation of the
securities laws-the subject of this Article-almost always is triggered by a
moderate to high probability of losses (otherwise the information that the cli-
ent seeks to conceal probably would not be material) and the concealment it-
self almost always involves a moderate to high probability of losses because of
the likelihood that the concealment will eventually be discovered.
73. See Rachlinski, supra note 68, at 135-50. The first survey asked stu-
dents to decide between taking a settlement offer and going to trial when the
settlement offer equaled the total stakes multiplied by the chance of winning.
The overall percentage of plaintiffs deciding to settle was 81.3%, and the over-
all percentage of defendants deciding to settle was 45.5%. See id. at 137. The
second survey told students that they were representing a defendant drug
company in a product liability suit that the plaintiff had offered to settle for $3
million prior to seeing some documents that the defendant had withheld in
discovery (the plaintiff would inevitably get to see the documents later if the
case did not settle, and the defendant's withholding of the documents, if the
case did settle before they were turned over, would arguably open up the case
to relitigation and could expose the defendant's lawyers to sanctions). Sub-
jects were also told either (a) that their client's in-house counsel believed that
the litigation had been going "well" because he originally had expected it to
settle for $5 million, or (b) that their client's in-house counsel believed that the
litigation had been going "badly" because he originally had expected it to settle
for $1 million. Only 12.5% of the first group, deciding in a "gains frame" chose
the risky (and arguably unethical) course of settling before the documents
were turned over, whereas 45% of the second group, deciding in a "losses
frame," opted for this course of action. See id. at 142.
74. See id. at 150-60. The mean cost to the plaintiffs in the sample of
plaintiffs' errors (rejection of settlement offers higher than or equal to the
amount won at trial) was $154,100, and the mean cost to the defendants in the
sample of defendants' errors (rejection of settlement offers lower than or equal
to the judgment imposed at trial) was more than twice as high at $376,500.
See id. at 158.
75. Id. at 144.
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likely to cheat on their taxes than taxpayers who expect a re-
fund.76 One of Rachlinski's student surveys furthermore sug-
gests that defense lawyers who are told that litigation is pro-
gressing worse than their clients' prior expectations are more
likely to cheat in discovery than defense lawyers whose clients
are pleased with better than expected progress thus far.
77
If these studies are reliable-and the substantial amount
of research done to date suggests that they are-prospect the-
ory is a powerful tool for predicting when managers of public
companies are likely to illegally conceal material facts from in-
vestors and regulators, and also when lawyers are likely to help
them do it. Prospect theory suggests that managers and law-
yers who evaluate disclosure decisions in a loss frame, in which
concealment offers the possibility of avoiding all or most of the
threatened losses, are likely to be more risk preferring than
managers and lawyers deciding whether to conceal information
simply in order to increase gains.
Because prospective gains and losses from concealment can
affect managers and lawyers (professional prestige, salary, fees
and value of stock holdings, etc.) differently than an organiza-
tion (profits, business reputation, etc.), agency problems within
a rational actor model may explain concealment that is irra-
tional for the organization.78 Agency problems, however, do not
explain concealment in all cases and sometimes only partially
explain it. Prospect theory explains another side of conceal-
ment by suggesting that, even in situations in which agents
and their organizational principals have parallel gains and
losses, decision-making in loss frames may result in conceal-
76. See id. at 124 n.50 (citing Henry S.J. Robben et al., Decision Frame
and Opportunity as Determinants of Tax Cheating: An International Experi-
mental Study, 11 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 341 (1990)).
77. See supra note 73 (discussing Professor Rachlinski's second student
survey).
78. Rational actor models analyze concealment of corporate information
as an agency problem. See generally Jennifer H. Arlen & William J. Carney,
Vicarious Liability for Fraud on the Securities Markets: Theory and Evidence,
1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 691; Paul G. Mahoney, Mandatory Disclosure as a Solu-
tion to Agency Problems, 62 U. CIE. L. REV. 1047 (1995). Rational actor mod-
els similarly analyze breaches by lawyers of their professional responsibilities
as agency problems. See Geoffrey P. Miller, Some Agency Problems in Settle-
ment, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 189, 202-03 (1987); see also Painter, supra note 11, at
284-85 (suggesting that an ex ante commitment by lawyers to blow the whistle
on client fraud could help overcome agency problems).
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When an individual client is planning a transaction in-
volving his own money, for example selling a business, the cli-
ent is usually choosing between gains when deciding how much
risk to incur. Sometimes, however, the client is choosing be-
tween losses, for example in the sale of an unsuccessful busi-
ness. Prospect theory predicts that the client choosing between
gains would be more risk averse than the client choosing be-
79. Cognitive biases other than the risk preferences identified by prospect
theory also underlie concealment of material information by an organization's
managers. See generally Donald C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A Behav-
ioral Theory of Why Corporations Mislead Stock Market Investors (and Cause
Other Social Harms), 146 U. PA. L. REV. 101 (1997). Langevoort points to sev-
eral psychological phenomena, including "cognitive conservatism and decision
simplification" that leads decision-makers to develop simplified explanations
of occurrences, or "schemas," that resist evidence of change, a tendency that is
exacerbated in group settings where stress comes from challenging commonly
held beliefs. See id. at 135-39, 135 n.114 & 136 n.118 (citing Dennis A. Gioia,
Pinto Fires and Personal Ethics: A Script Analysis of Missed Opportunities, 11
J. BUS. ETHICS 379 (1992) (discussing why Ford Motor's product recall per-
sonnel missed danger signs associated with the Pinto's on-road performance
because of a "normalcy" schema ); Sara Kiesler & Lee Sproull, Managerial Re-
sponse to Changing Environments: Perspectives on Problem Sensing from So-
cial Cognition, 27 ADMIN. SC. Q. 548, 549 (1982)). Another phenomena
pointed out by Professor Langevoort is "overoptimism," or the tendency of or-
ganizations to promote an optimistic frame of view in order to promote hard
work and long-term commitment by employees, even though this mindset de-
flects or rationalizes evidence of negative developments. See id. at 139-41
(citing MARTIN E.P. SELIGMAN, LEARNED OPTIMISM 100-12 (1991); Edward J.
Zajac & Max H. Bazerman, Blind Spots for Industry and Competitor Analysis:
Implications for Interfirm (Mis)perceptions for Strategic Decisions, 16 ACAD.
MGMT. REV. 37 (1991)). Langevoort also points to the concept of "commit-
ment" which leads people, once they have made a commitment to a person or
course of conduct, to consistently adhere to that commitment even if later con-
fronted with evidence that the commitment was a bad choice. See id. at 142
n.142 (citing Barry M. Staw, The Escalation of Commitment to a Course of Ac-
tion, 6 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 577 (1981)). Finally, Langevoort points to "self-
serving beliefs," or the fact that when there is sufficient ambiguity to allow it,
people will infer facts that do not threaten their self-esteem or career pros-
pects. See id. at 143-46 (citing Dennis A. Gioia, Self-Serving Bias as a Self-
Sensemaking Strategy in Explicit vs. Tacit Impression Management, in
IMPRESSION MANAGEMENT IN THE ORGANIZATION 219, 230-33 (Robert A. Gia-
calone & Paul Rosenfeld eds., 1989)). Although "overoptimism" bias might be
negligible in a loss frame, the other psychological biases identified by
Langevoort would generally reinforce the risk preferring choices, including
concealment, that prospect theory identifies as attractive to corporate manag-
ers choosing between prospective losses.
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tween losses. Thus, the client selling a business at a gain
might prefer a buyer paying cash to a buyer offering a higher
price but paying with an IOU. The client selling at a loss is
more likely to prefer the buyer offering the higher price, even
though there is more risk that the seller will not actually re-
ceive all of the money. If prospect theory also predicts ethical
risk taking-as earlier studies of taxpayer behavior 80 and Pro-
fessor Rachlinski's study of lawyer behavior in responding to
discovery requests8' suggest it does-a client selling his busi-
ness at a loss is not only more likely to take risks with an un-
reliable buyer than the client selling his business for a gain,
but is also more likely to take the risk of making misrepresen-
tations about the business to the buyer.
If, however, the client is an organization, risk preferences
in both loss and gain frames are complicated by the agency
problems that affect rational decision-makers regardless of
cognitive biases. A corporation's shareholders, for example, are
usually more risk preferring than its bondholders, for the sim-
ple reason that equity capital gets most of the gains when risk
pays off whereas debt capital bears a substantial portion of the
losses when a business fails. Although managers are chosen by
shareholders rather than bondholders (unless the company is
in default), managers, because their human capital and often
their financial capital are not diversified, are sometimes more
risk averse than diversified shareholders would prefer. On the
other hand, managers who own stock options may be risk pre-
ferring, knowing that they are essentially gambling with the
shareholders' (and the creditors') money. A public corporation,
a business with substantial borrowed capital, or a close corpo-
ration controlled by majority shareholders is thus likely to be
operated in a manner that, for perfectly rational reasons, in-
curs a different level of risk than at least some of the owners of
the capital at risk would want. Cognitive biases may change
the risk preferences of the owners of capital and of managers,
depending upon whether the business is in a gain frame or a
loss frame, but these biases coexist with the rational calcula-
tions of decision-makers who do not themselves bear all of the
gains and losses from the risks they incur. Agency problems in
such circumstances may reinforce or offset distortions resulting
from cognitive biases.
80. See Rachlinski, supra note 68, at 124 n.50 (citing studies).




When an organization is in financial trouble, however, ra-
tional actor incentives will usually reinforce the risk preferring
bias predicted by prospect theory. Businesses in financial
trouble are usually heavily in debt and may even have negative
shareholder equity. Financial institutions that are failing take
their gambles almost entirely with customers' money, or with
federally insured deposits. In these situations, shareholders'
rational preference for risk taking is enhanced. Managers in
turn may shift from risk aversion toward risk preference if, for
them, losing the shareholders' money is as devastating profes-
sionally and financially as losing both the shareholders and the
creditors' money. These rational incentives thus point in the
same direction as the bias predicted by prospect theory-risk
taking in a loss frame, to the extent permitted by the law and
perhaps beyond what is legally permitted, is attractive.
8 2 If
such business risk cannot be incurred openly, the business's
managers may also decide to incur the additional risk of con-
cealment.
Finally, even if an organization does not affirmatively in-
cur additional business risks in a loss frame, its managers may
still prefer to take the risk of concealing the fact that the busi-
ness is facing losses, whether from poor financial results or
violations of the law, hoping that the business cycle, remedial
measures, or sheer luck will bail them out. The legal risks of
concealment and the risk that the problem could get worse
while it is concealed might be preferred over the more certain
82. See James D. Cox, Private Litigation and the Deterrence of Corporate
Misconduct, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1997, at 1, 5-8 (applying pros-
pect theory to misconduct of corporate managers). Professor Cox wrote:
Under prospect theory, aversion to or preference for risk depends
upon the outcomes of choices in relation to the target point. For ex-
ample, studies have with fair consistency demonstrated that manag-
ers are risk preferring whenever most of the outcomes posed by the
choices facing them fall below the target point. In such a situation,
managers tend to prefer the choice that affords a chance of meeting or
surpassing the target point. Correlatively, risk aversion is typical
when the expected values are above the target point.
Id. at 6 (citing Duncan M. Holthausen, A Risk-Return Model with Risk and
Return Measured as Deviations from Target Return, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 182
(1981); John W. Payne et al., Further Tests of Aspiration Level Effects in Risky
Choice Behavior, 27 MGMT. SC. 953 (1981)). Cox posits that, if illegal conduct
is the only choice that can put a manager above a target point set by the en-
dowment effect-for example an already announced performance bonus-the
manager acting according to prospect theory will likely choose the risk-




costs of prompt disclosure. Sometimes rational actor models
will point in this direction (particularly if agency problems en-
courage concealment), but sometimes they will not. Prospect
theory suggests that, even in the latter case, managers may
still choose to conceal even though concealment is not in their
own, or the organization's, best interests.
B. LAWYER CONCEALMENT
Prospect theory also has important implications for the
practice of law. For example, Professors Langevoort and Ras-
mussen have observed that lawyers overstate legal risk when
they advise business clients in transactions.8 3 Agency problems
explain part of this risk aversion-lawyers are unlikely to
share most of the upside from their clients' risky decisions, but
if something goes wrong, lawyers are likely to share much of
the blame.84 Caution's importance as a sociological norm of the
legal profession could also be a factor.85 Psychological biases
also might cause lawyers to overestimate risk,86 although other
psychological biases point in the opposite direction.87 It is
noteworthy, however, that Langevoort and Rasmussen limit
83. See Donald C. Langevoort & Robert K. Rasmussen, Skewing the Re-
sults: The Role of Lawyers in Transmitting Legal Rules, 5 S. CAL. INTERDISC.
L.J. 375, 377 (1997).
84. See id; see also Donald C. Langevoort, The Epistemology of Corporate-
Securities Lawyering Beliefs, Biases and Organizational Behavior, 63 BROOK.
L. REV. 629, 655 (1997). Professor Langevoort wrote:
A lawyer loses far more by giving the go ahead to a course of action
that is later subject to legal sanction than she gains from advice that
is not challenged. On the other hand, there is frequently no reputa-
tional penalty from too much caution because the client lacks the
knowledge and expertise to second-guess the lawyer's judgment. In
sum (and subject to some predictable exceptions), lawyers are moti-
vated to overstate legal risk.
Id.
85. See Langevoort & Rasmussen, supra note 83, at 413-19 (discussing
caution as a norm in the legal profession and the possibility that overstating
legal risk could be a technique to influence clients toward caution).
86. See id. at 423-26 (discussing "defensive pessimism," or the tendency to
overweigh negative outcomes); id. at 426-28 (discussing "accountability" bias,
or the tendency toward caution when it is known that the evaluation will
likely be evaluated ex-post); id. at 428-30 (discussing "self interest-ego" bias,
or the tendency to find risk when the evaluator benefits from its presence).
87. See id. at 422-23 (discussing "cognitive conservatism" that resists new
law or facts contradicting a prior "schema" that is in turn likely to be con-
structed around the client's intended course of action, "commitment" bias that
sticks with this schema and with the client even in the face of adverse law or
facts, and bias toward overoptimism).
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their study to advice given in business settings, which usually,
although not always, involve decisions that are made in a gains
frame for both lawyers and clients. 88 Even without taking
risks, the client is likely to make money from the transaction
and the lawyer-client relationship is likely to remain intact.
Langevoort's and Rasmussen's observations about overestima-
tion of risk do not extend to litigation, and Rachlinski's studies
suggest that lawyers who advise corporate defendants choosing
between losses in litigation tend to be risk preferring.89
Prospect theory also could predict when lawyers are likely
to get into trouble.90 A lawyer may be more likely to assist a
client who is using the lawyer's services to violate the law (a
violation of Model Rule 1.2(d))91 in situations where the facts
are already bad, either for the client, for the lawyer or for
both.92 An important deal about to collapse, as in SEC v. Na-
tional Student Marketing,93 or an ongoing securities fraud by a
nearly insolvent client, as in In re Carter and Johnson,94 are al-
88. Langevoort and Rasmussen mention psychological differences in the
ways people approach possible gains and losses. See id. at 425 n.111. But
they limit this discussion to a footnote and do not discuss how prospect theory
might predict underestimation of risk in a loss frame.
89. See supra text accompanying notes 71-77.
90. Once again, other cognitive biases may also come into play. See Don-
ald C. Langevoort, Where Were the Lawyers? A Behavioral Inquiry into Law-
yers' Responsibility for Clients' Fraud, 46 VAND. L. REV. 75, 101-11 (1993)
(positing that lawyers may not be good monitors of their clients' conduct be-.
cause, having agreed to represent a client, they are motivated by biases-such
as commitment, overoptimism and cognitive conservatism in processing new
information that contradicts existing schema-to see the client's activities as
permissible and thus to ignore red flags).
91. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2(d) (1983).
92. Professor Rachlinski and this author plan to conduct surveys designed
to test the hypothesis advanced here with respect to client fraud, as well as
the hypothesis that lawyers are, in a wide range of ethics dilemmas, more
likely to take risks in a loss frame than in a gains frame.
93. SEC v. National Student Mktg. Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682 (D.D.C. 1978).
The attorneys representing National Student Marketing (National) discovered
that National's earnings had been overstated in financial statements, yet al-
lowed a merger of National into another company to go forward without reso-
liciting approval from both companies' shareholders. See id. at 712-13. The
court held that the attorneys aided and abetted their client in violation of Sec-
tion 10-b of the 1934 Act because the attorneys neglected their duty to protest
National's decision to go ahead with the merger. See id. at 715. "Their silence
was not only a breach of this duty to speak, but in addition lent the appear-
ance of legitimacy to the closing." Id. at 713 (citation omitted).
94. In re Carter & Johnson, Exchange Act Release No. 17,597, [1981
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 82,847, at 84,145 (Feb. 28, 1981).
Carter and Johnson represented National Telephone (National) over almost
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ready no-win situations for lawyers bound to lose their client,
their unpaid legal bills and possibly their reputation. Lawyers
who never would have facilitated the conduct that got their cli-
ents into trouble to begin with (and who even advised against
the illegal conduct 95), when deciding how to cut their losses,
may help conceal the client's violations and take other risks
that a "rational" lawyer would not. In both Carter and Johnson
and National Student Marketing, the lawyers' participation in
client concealment almost certainly was not rational from the
vantage point of the lawyers' professional reputations (and the
concealment probably was not rational for their clients either),
yet the concealment occurred anyway. The client, or the cli-
ent's transaction, however, was already in deep trouble before
any of the lawyer wrongdoing alleged by the SEC took place.
Prospect theory may explain what happened in these cases, and
more generally may explain why, sometimes, the worse things
get, the more likely a lawyer is to compound his own and his
client's troubles with violations of ethics rules, violations of law
or both.
9 6
Prospect theory may also explain why lawyers take big
risks to conceal their own errors. As risk averse as lawyers are
when tempted with the gains of assisting a client crime or
fraud to begin with, once they are pressured into participation
in the client's misconduct, or because of their own negligence
fail to notice it in time, they may be willing to bear the addi-
tional risk of concealing the problem by lying or telling half
truths to outside auditors, to regulators, or even to their own
client's board of directors. In these situations, it is easy to at-
two years during which National ignored Carter and Johnson's legal advice
and persisted in repeated violations of the securities laws, including issuing
false press releases, sending misleading letters to shareholders, and filing
misleading disclosure statements with the SEC. See id. at 84,153-64. The
SEC found that Carter and Johnson each had an obligation to take affirmative
steps to correct National's disclosure violations, such as approaching other
members of National's board of directors or resigning. See id. at 84,172. Car-
ter and Johnson had warned National about its conduct, but did not resign or
inform the National's board of their client's violations until the company was
nearly bankrupt. See id. at 84,162-64.
95. This was clearly the case in Carter & Johnson.
96. Escalating commitment of economic resources (such as unbilled or un-
paid for lawyer time) to a particular client could also change economic payoffs
and make unethical conduct more attractive to the "rational" lawyer. This is
unlikely, however, because previous investment of time or money in a client
does not often change the prospective payoffs likely to arise from continuing to
represent that client, and unless the payoffs do change, "sunk costs" should be
irrelevant to rational decisions about what a lawyer does in the future.
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tribute lawyer concealment to the bad judgment that got a law-
yer into trouble to begin with, but something else may also be
at work. Prospect theory explains what that something else
may be.
Decision-making in a loss frame is further affected if deci-
sion-makers conceal risk preferring behavior from themselves
by adjusting their estimates of risk artificially downward to
make it appear that they are making risk neutral or risk averse
decisions when in fact they are not.97 A lawyer thus may con-
vince himself that the facts or the law are different than they
really are. In the Carter and Johnson case, for example, the
lawyers fooled themselves into believing that their client's
problems were more hypothetical than real, and that they as
lawyers were in any event doing the right thing.98 Selective
reading of ethics rules, reading rules out of context and other
methods of artificially deflating risk convince the lawyer that
she is acting according to the norms of her profession, even if
her interpretation of her ethical obligations would be rejected
by a neutral outsider (and perhaps also by a lawyer making
ethical decisions in a gains frame).
As Professors Langevoort and Rasmussen observe, rational
incentives, social norms and even cognitive biases ordinarily
point in the direction of lawyer conservatism and unwillingness
to take risks in a business setting.99 Lawyers who thus overes-
timate risk also would not ordinarily take the risk of partici-
pating in the initial stages of a client crime or fraud, and in-
deed very few suits or disciplinary actions are brought against
lawyers for conspiring with their clients from the outset to vio-
97. See Rachlinski, supra note 68, at 134-35 (discussing how subjects in
litigation settlement negotiation simulation studies overestimate their
chances of winning and therefore perceive their own risk preferring reserva-
tion prices to be risk averse) (citing George Loewenstein et al., Self-Serving
Assessments of Fairness and Pretrial Bargaining, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 135
(1993) (detailing a study of overconfidence in evaluation of litigation pros-
pects)).
98. See Richard W. Painter, The Moral Interdependence of Corporate Law-
yers and Their Clients, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 507, 566 (1994) (discussing how
Johnson fooled himself into believing that he had fulfilled his responsibility by
noting his disapproval on a copy of National Telephone's misleading quarterly
report that he then sent to his law firm's files, without mentioning his disap-
proval to National; and how Carter and Johnson both phrased their legal ad-
vice to National in hypothetical language in order to avoid confronting the fact
that the securities laws required National to disclose accurate information to
its shareholders and the fact that National was nearly insolvent).
99. See Langevoort & Rasmussen, supra note 83, at 377, 413-25.
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late the law or to defraud third persons. When things go
wrong, however, and the gains frame shifts to a loss frame,
even a small loss of income or professional prestige can loom
large in a lawyer's mind, and the lawyer may find herself tak-
ing unreasonable risks not only to save the client's skin but be-
cause she believes that she has to save her own.
IV. RESPONDING TO THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
CONCEALMENT
What, if anything, can be done about the psychology of con-
cealment? Although pervasive risk preferring behavior in loss
frames has been detected by psychological studies, only a few of
these studies go beyond simulating decisions between prospec-
tive monetary gains and losses to simulate ethical decisions as
well.1°° More research thus clearly needs to be done on ethical
decisions in loss frames, and in particular on loss frames where
not only loss of money but also professional prestige and repu-
tation are at stake. As a preliminary matter, however, it ap-
pears safe to conclude that risk preferring bias in decisions ex-
ists, but can also be mitigated by both professional
responsibility rules and private arrangements between law-
yers, auditors and clients.
First, if lawyers are likely to underestimate the risks of
concealment in a loss frame, ethics rules that minimize lawyer
discretion when a client is in trouble may be prefer'able to dis-
cretion laden rules. A specific requirement, for example, that a
lawyer must report crime or fraud to the full board of directors
of a corporate client,10I or to the client's auditors, might over-
come the lawyer's bias toward risk taking in bad situations,
even though there is no guarantee that the lawyer will obey the
rule. Vague standards such as Model Rule 1.13's requirement
that the lawyer "proceed in the best interests of the organiza-
tion"10 2 might, on the other hand, invite the lawyer to collabo-
rate with client concealment, particularly if management
100. See Rachlinski, supra note 68, at 124 & n.50 (citing psychological
studies demonstrating that taxpayers who owe money are more likely to cheat
on their taxes than taxpayers who expect a refund); id. at 140-44 (discussing
surveys of Cornell Law School students suggesting that defense lawyers who
are told that litigation is progressing worse than their clients' prior expecta-
tions are more likely to cheat in discovery than defense lawyers whose clients
are pleased with reports of better-than-expected progress).
101. See supra text accompanying notes 39-41.
102. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.13 (1983).
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makes a credible case that concealment is in the best interests
of the organization. Even if the risks of concealment are not in
the best interests of the organization-or of the lawyer for that
matter-the lawyer may underestimate these risks and con-
vince herself that they are worth it. Although auditors' rules
allow some discretion to resolve ambiguity, for example the dis-
cretion to determine at what point "it is likely that an illegal
act has occurred,"10 3 auditors' rules for disclosure of client crime
and fraud allow for less discretion than lawyers' rules. To the
extent discretion is likely to be used to incur additional risk in
loss frames, auditors' rules may discourage risk taking that
clearly violates a rule, whereas the indeterminacy of lawyers'
rules may encourage rationalization by lawyers in borderline
cases.
A second response to risk preferring behavior in a loss
frame is for the decision-maker to decide at an earlier point in
time how to respond to a future choice between losses, and then
prospectively to lock in this decision with a rule. This approach
is useful if the decision-maker is less risk preferring when fac-
ing hypothetical losses rather than actual losses, or the deci-
sion maker is aware that he is vulnerable to risk preferring be-
havior in a loss frame and wants to take precautionary steps
before decisions between losses actually have to be made. Al-
though a risk preferring decision-maker still may choose to
violate the rule when confronted with a loss frame later on, the
rule could sometimes be a valuable deterrent to risk seeking
behavior, at least in borderline cases. The managers of a cor-
porate client thus might decide that disclosure is preferable to
the risks of concealment, even if, when actually confronted with
potential losses later, they might prefer to take their chances
with concealment. Lawyers also might want to protect them-
selves from their own risk preferring behavior if something
goes wrong later. They could seek to do this by obtaining a cli-
ent waiver of confidentiality in advance and then perhaps tak-
ing the additional step of committing themselves to disclose
material information about a client to its auditors.
Yet another response is to use risk assessments from
evaluators who are not deciding in a loss frame. Lawyers and
auditors can check a client's decisions when the client is in
trouble, but, if the predictions of prospect theory are correct,




they are only likely to assess risk more conservatively than
their clients if they are not also in trouble. If some of the pro-
fessionals are also in trouble or identify too closely with the cli-
ent's loss frame, other professionals may be required to check
their assessments of risk. Second legal opinions and second
opinions on auditing issues may be requested. 10 4 Lawyers and
auditors can sometimes even check each other's decisions. If
the lawyers are making decisions in a loss frame (for example,
the client's problems result from previous legal error), the audi-
tors may still be in a gains frame, and vice versa (the financial
statements could be wrong, even though the client has done
nothing illegal-yet). Effective correction by lawyers and ac-
countants of each other's decisions, however, assumes that each
professional has some expertise in the other's evaluative crite-
ria as well as knowledge of the underlying facts, two improb-
able contingencies if expertise and information are not com-
monly shared across professional boundaries.10
5
V. RESPONSES TO THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
CONCEALMENT IN MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE
Lawyers and auditors who practice together will have to
accommodate the different rules that the two professions play
by. When lawyers' and auditors' confidentiality rules conflict,
which shall trump the other?
This issue was raised before the ABA Commission on Mul-
tidisciplinary Practice by opponents of multidisciplinary prac-
tice,10 6 and is divisive enough within the ABA that it could de-
rail the Commission's proposal to permit multidisciplinary
104. See generally Michael Klausner, Geoffrey Miller & Richard Painter,
Second Opinions in Litigation, 84 VA. L. REV. 1411 (1998) (discussing agency
and other problems with legal advice, and some of the reasons clients do and
do not obtain second opinions in litigation).
105. Yet another way to counteract bias toward risk taking in "no win"
situations is to reward risk reduction. Corporate sentencing guidelines, for
example, decrease financial penalties when a defendant has control mecha-
nisms in place to detect and prevent illegal acts. Some ethics codes provide for
mitigation of discipline for lawyers who promptly take steps to report their
own misconduct or to rectify injury caused by themselves or a client in connec-
tion with their misconduct. These rational incentives may or may not over-
come the risk preferences that perpetuate concealment. See text accompany-
ing supra notes 80-82.
106. COMMISSION ON MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE, AMERICAN BAR ASS'N,
REPORTER'S NOTES n.77 (1999), available at <http/www.abanet.org/
cpr/mdpappendixc.html> (citing several authors who raised these concerns,
including Lawrence J. Fox, Sydney M. Cone, and Edward Lamar Taylor).
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practice when it reaches the House of Delegates. How the con-
fidentiality issue is resolved, however, will also determine
whether multidisciplinary firms can respond more effectively
than do lawyers and accountants practicing separately to con-
cealment in a client fraud scenario. In turn, this could have a
significant impact on the SEC's future attitude toward multi-
disciplinary practice, and in particular on whether the SEC
might reconsider its stand against lawyers and auditors repre-
senting the same client simultaneously.10 7
A. THE MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE COMMISSION'S RESPONSE
The Commission addressed the confidentiality issue by
coming down squarely on the side of lawyers' rules on client se-
crecy. As the Commission notes in its Report:
Concerns were expressed about the possible inappropriate disclo-
sure of confidential client information within an MDP, since there is
not uniformity among different professions about the circumstances
under which client information may, must, or must not be disclosed to
a third party. The Commission recommends that no change be made
to the lawyer's obligation to protect confidential client information.
Acknowledging that a nonlawyer in an MDP may be subject to an ob-
ligation of disclosure that is inconsistent with the lawyer's obligation
of confidentiality (e.g., the disclosure obligations of mental health care
workers in cases of suspected child abuse or the disclosure obligation
of accountants performing the attest or audit function), the Commis-
sion specifically recommends several safeguards to assure that a
nonlawyer who works with, or assists, a lawyer in the delivery of le-
gal services will act in a manner consistent with the lawyer's profes-
sional obligations.10
Lawyers' rules on client secrecy thus should, according to the
Commission, trump the disclosure rules of other professions,
even in situations where bodily injury such as child abuse
might result from nondisclosure (although lawyers are permit-
ted under Model Rule 1.6 to disclose in cases where death or
bodily injury might result, they are not required to do so' 0 9). In
situations where only financial injury can result and lawyers
are forbidden to disclose (under the current version of Model
Rule 1.6110), once again lawyers' secrecy rules are supposed to
107. See supra text accompanying notes 2-5.
108. COMMISSION ON MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE, AMERICAN BAR ASS'N,
REPORT (1999), available at <http'/www.abanet.org/cpr/mdpreport.html>
[hereinafter REPORT].
109. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1983).
110. See supra note 43 and accompanying text (explaining how most juris-
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trump auditors' disclosure rules when lawyers and auditors
practice together. To reinforce this point, the Commission also
proposes additions to the comments to Model Rule 1.6 govern-
ing confidentiality:
[23] A lawyer in an MDP who provides legal services to the MDP's
clients may encounter confidentiality problems that require special
attention. The lawyer should scrupulously observe the rules of pro-
fessional conduct relating to the protection of confidential client in-
formation.
[24] A lawyer in an MDP who delivers legal services to the MDP's
clients and who works with, or is assisted by, a nonlawyer in the
MDP who is delivering nonlegal services in connection with the deliv-
ery of legal services to a client should make reasonable efforts to en-
sure that the nonlawyer behaves in a manner that discharges the
lawyer's obligation of confidentiality. (See Comment, Rule 5.3)
[25] In the context of an MDP, there is a particular concern about
the potential loss of the attorney-client privilege, arising out of the
possibility that the MDP's clients might not be properly informed as
to the separate functions performed by the MDP and that the mem-
bers of the MDP would not treat legal matters in a fashion appropri-
ate to the preservation of the privilege. A lawyer in an MDP should
take special care to avoid endangering the privilege by either the
lawyer's own conduct or that of the MDP itself, or its nonlawyer
members, and should take such measures as shall be necessary to
prevent disclosure of confidential information to members of the MDP
who are not providing services in connection with the delivery of the
legal services to the client. (See Comment, Rule 5.1).'"
Although the Commission contemplates that lawyers will
represent clients simultaneously with professionals who have
broader disclosure obligations (for example, mental health care
workers), the Commission's Report takes a more guarded posi-
tion on whether lawyers and auditors should represent a client
simultaneously, and the Commission in a later statement sided
with the SEC on this issue.
112
dictions have, however, adopted the Model Code rule which permits, but does
not require, the lawyer to disclose).
111. COMMISSION ON MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTIcE, AMERICAN BAR ASS'N,
APPENDIX A (1999), available at <http'//www.abanet.org/cpr/mdpappandixa.
html> (providing illustrations of possible amendments to the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct).
112. See REPORT, supra note 108, at n.3. The ABA Commission noted that:
In a letter from the Office of the Chief Accountant (OCA) of the Secu-
rities and Exchange Commission (SEC), this Commission was advised
that the SEC has asked the Independence Standards Board (ISB) to
place the topic of legal advisory services on its agenda. The SEC in-
tends to look to the ISB for leadership in establishing auditor inde-
pendence regulations applicable to the audits of the financial state-
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One alternative, discussed in the Commission's Reporter's
notes and urged by some auditing firms that want to merge
with law firms, is to construct a "firewall" between the lawyers
and auditors so each of the professions can continue to play ac-
cording to its own rules. 13 The "firewall" approach, however,
only delays disclosures that the lawyers usually will be re-
quired to make to the auditors in response to an audit letter."
14
If the "firewall" is successful at reinforcing the psychology of
concealment beyond that point, the lawyers may expose them-
selves to substantial liability for participating in the client's
concealment if they do not resign from the representation. Fi-
nally, the "firewall" approach is sure to exacerbate the SEC's
concerns about nondisclosure when lawyers and auditors
within the same firm represent the same client.
B. THE WAIVER RESPONSE
A second approach would be for the lawyers to obtain client
consent to their sharing with auditors practicing within their
firm any information that is material to the audit. The audi-
ments of SEC registrants. According to the letter, the SEC auditor
independence regulations specifically state that the roles of auditors
and attorneys under federal securities laws are incompatible. The
OCA would consider an auditing firm's independence from an SEC
registrant to be impaired if that firm also provides legal advice to the
registrant or its affiliates. The Commission believes that this issue is
correctly initially discussed in those fora. When the ISB completes its
study, appropriate ABA entities will wish to comment on its recom-
mendations and, possibly, to take formal positions.
See id. The Commission later supported the SEC's position in an explanatory
statement:
The Commission shares the SEC's position and regrets that it did not
make this point sufficiently clear. Finally, the Commission notes the
concerns expressed by SEC Commissioner Norman S. Johnson, who
views the expansion of accounting firms into legal services as prob-
lematic. Commissioner Johnson's concerns focused on many of the
same issues as did this Commission's Report and Recommendation,
such as the preservation of a lawyer's independent professional judg-
ment and the lawyer's duty to preserve a client's confidences and
avoid conflicts of interest.
See COMMISSION ON MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE, AMERICAN BAR ASS'N,
UPDATED BACKGROUND AND INFORMATION REPORT AND REQUEST FOR
COMMENTS (1999), available at <http'//www.abanet.org/cpr/febmdp.html>
(citing SEC Commissioner Johnson Addresses Auditor Independence, SEC
TODAY, Oct. 13, 1999, at 5).
113. COMMISSION ON MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE,-AMERICAN BAR ASS'N,
REPORTERS NOTES n.76 (1999), available at <http'Iwww.abanet.org/
cpr/mdpappendixc.html>.
114. See supra text accompanying notes 46-49.
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tors would then be required to play by their own rules in re-
sponding to the information, meaning that illegal acts might
have to be disclosed outside the client organization.
15
Once the client agrees to permit disclosure, liability con-
cerns should induce disclosure by the lawyers to the auditors of
facts material to the audit. The SEC will probably never agree
to permit one firm to provide both auditing and legal services to
the same client unless information known to the lawyers about
the client is legally attributable to the auditors. If so, liability
will be a powerful incentive for multidisciplinary firms to im-
plement information sharing policies designed to overcome the
psychology of concealment. 116 The discretion laden mandate of
Model Rule 1.13, requiring the lawyer to "proceed as is rea-
sonably necessary in the best interest of the organization," will
be carried out against the backdrop of auditor partners' insis-
tence on being informed pursuant to the terms of the ex ante
agreement with the client that its lawyers may keep the audi-
tors informed.
While liability concerns might necessitate lawyer-auditor
communication within a multidisciplinary firm, this regime is
not mandatory for clients. Clients have a choice-they can
shun one-stop shopping and hire a separate law firm whose
relationship with accountants is governed by the existing audit
letter procedure and accountants who are unlikely to have law-
yers' knowledge attributed to them for liability purposes. Only
clients that want auditing and legal services from the same
firm will have to consent to direct and uninhibited communica-
tion between auditors and lawyers about information that is
material to the audit. This arrangement will be avoided by
some clients, but should be attractive to others that want to as-
sure investors, regulators and third parties that they have en-
115. See supra text accompanying notes 54-59. Because of auditors' disclo-
sure obligations, clients would have to understand that the attorney-client
privilege would almost certainly be waived with respect to information dis-
closed by lawyers to auditors pursuant to such an arrangement.
116. See supra note 50-51 (pointing out that auditors but not lawyers are
routinely exposed to liability under Section 11 of the 1933 Act, and that audi-
tors must affirmatively establish "reasonable investigation" as a defense). For
purposes of satisfying this "reasonable investigation" defense, auditors nor-
mally do have to follow through with conventional audit letter procedures, but
the knowledge of their clients' lawyers is not generally attributable to the
auditors if the lawyers choose to misrepresent facts that the auditors would
not have ordinarily uncovered in a reasonable investigation.
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hanced procedures for detection and prevention of fraud and
other illegal acts.
' 17
C. CRITIQUES OF THE WAIVER RESPONSE
1. Inconsistency with the Values of the Profession
Arguably, confidentiality is a core value of the legal profes-
sion that should not be subject to irrevokable client waiver ex
ante (before all of the circumstances become known). Some
ethics rules clearly cannot be contracted around. For example,
a lawyer cannot, even with client consent, acquire a financial
interest in the subject matter of litigation,"18 or commingle cli-
ent funds with his own. 119 Other rules can be waived, but are
usually waived ex-post. For example, waiver of conflicts be-
tween clients generally is not obtained by the first client when
she retains counsel, but instead when the second client seeks
representation, 120 although in some circumstances a sophisti-
cated client is permitted prospectively to waive conflicts with
other clients. 121 Although Model Rule 1.6 clearly permits a cli-
117. See generally Painter, supra note 11 (discussing the advantages of an
ex ante opt-in disclosure regime).
118. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.8(0) (1983).
A lawyer shall not acquire a proprietary interest in the cause of action
or subject matter of litigation the lawyer is conducting for a client, ex-
cept that the lawyer may: (1) acquire a lien granted by law to secure
the lawyer's fee or expenses; and (2) contract with a client for a rea-
sonable contingent fee in a civil case.
Id.
119. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.15 (1983).
Model Rule 1.15 does, however, allow the client to opt out of the provision re-
quiring that attorney trust accounts be kept in the state where the lawyer's
office is situated. See id.
120. Many courts are skeptical of advance conflict waivers. See, e.g.,
Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Gulf Oil, 588 F.2d 221, 229 (7th Cir. 1978) (re-
fusing to enforce an alleged understanding between Gulf and a law firm hired
by Gulf that the firm could continue to represent another longstanding client
with potentially adverse interests to Gulf if a dispute between the two should
arise). Advance conflict waivers are discussed more extensively in Richard W.
Painter, Advance Waiver of Conflicts, 13 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS (forthcoming
May 2000).
121. Some recent cases endorse a more flexible approach to ex ante con-
flicts waivers. See, e.g., Unified Sewerage Agency v. Jelco, Inc., 646 F.2d 1339,
1346 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that a client's "longstanding" consent to a conflict
coupled with reliance by others can amount to estoppel); Fisons Corp. v. Ato-
chem N. Am., Inc., No. 90 Civ. 1080, 1990 WL 180551, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14,
1990) (approving of advance consent to a conflict); Interstate Properties v.
Pyramid Co., 547 F. Supp. 178, 183 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (approving of an advance
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ent to consent to disclosure of confidential information, few
lawyers have tried arrangements where consent is irrevokable,
and few courts of have ruled on this issue.
122
Ex ante waiver of confidentiality was denounced by Larry
Fox, one of the staunchest opponents of multidisciplinary prac-
tice, in his testimony before the ABA Commission:
Just when a legal client may most want to preserve a confidence,
lawyers working at these accounting firms will be compelled to dis-
close it-running directly afoul of our most cherished professional
value. Recognizing the fact that their lawyers really are practicing
law and the inherent conflict in roles and rules, the Big 5 responds by
explaining that they receive waivers of confidentiality from their cli-
ents before each engagement. But this is no cure. A lawyers [sic]
duty of confidentiality is not waiveable for the benefit of the lawyer
and, even if it were, a prospective waiver would be void since by defi-
nition it could never be knowing and intelligent.123
Fox does not consider the possibility that waiver could be for
the benefit of the client, as well as the lawyer, and particularly
for the benefit of the client's shareholders. Neither does he
consider the fact that most clients using both legal and audit-
ing services are businesses that are sophisticated enough to de-
cide for themselves whether prospective waiver is appropriate.
Fox also does not cite case law to support his argument that a
prospective waiver would be void, particularly if the waiver
merely states that the lawyer will disclose information material
to the client's financial statements to its auditors. Finally, Fox
does not explain why concealment of information from auditors,
particularly information that could concern client fraud and il-
legal acts, should be included among the profession's "most
cherished" values, or a public policy reason why prospective
waiver of secrecy by a public company should be void.
Indeed, a publicly-held company is already bound to dis-
close information material to its financial statements to its
auditors and ultimately to its investors. Prospective waiver of
conflict waiver on the ground that there was little evidence that the client
communicated confidential information to the law firm).
122. Relevant case law is sparse and arises almost exclusively in the con-
text of a prospective waiver of confidentiality with respect to other clients, not
a waiver of confidentiality with respect to auditors. See, e.g., Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., 588 F.2d at 227-29 (finding that the claimed agreement would
impermissibly result in the lawyer's breach of the duty to keep confidences);
Interstate Properties, 547 F. Supp. at 183 (finding that, based on the facts be-
fore the court and the language of the prior lawyer-client agreement, there
had been no confidential communications in the first place).
123. Fox Remarks, supra note 6.
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lawyer confidentiality only affects who discloses and when.
Fox, however, minimizes the significance of this inevitability:
Demonstrating both the weakness of their waiver argument and
their callous disregard for our values, the auditors then argue that
confidentiality is really no big deal. After all, if a public company has
a duty to disclose, all that Big 5 lawyers are getting their clients to
agree to is the disclosure by the lawyer of information to the auditors
that the client would be obliged to tell the auditors anyway.
The argument is as outrageous as it is indifferent to our core val-
ues. All lawyers know that in order to be effective at what we do a
client must know that the lawyer-client relationship is sacrosanct.
One need look no further than how we viewed Ken Starr's attack on
the deceased Vince Foster's privileged communications to understand
how fragile our assurances of confidentiality can be and how jealously
we must guard them. The profession rightly rose as one to argue that
our clients will be inhibited even by knowing that disclosure of their
confidences will only follow death. Here the possibility of disclosure
is more likely, guaranteed to be timely, and obviously something that
the client will be forced to live with.
2 4
The Office of Independent Counsel is a convenient foil, but
Kenneth Starr's unsuccessful effort to obtain Vincent Foster's
communications with his attorneys125 has little to do with ex
ante voluntary waiver by a public company of lawyer secrecy
with respect to information that the company is already legally
obligated to disclose. Indeed, the relationship between a law-
yer and a client corporation that is making a securities filing
usually already contemplates that the lawyer will be asked for
this information by the accountants in an attorney letter and
that the lawyer will truthfully respond.
Finally, Fox argues that lawyers should not have to deal
with the uncertainties of materiality when determining
whether information must be disclosed:
Moreover, information is ambiguous and materiality a term of art,
not a mathematical formula. To place a lawyer in a trap between a
duty to a client and a duty to his non-lawyer auditing masters creates
an impossible dilemma whose only product can be second-rate legal
services and a compromise of ethical principles. Advocates (and by
that term I include all lawyers, transactional and trial), and auditors,
as in that old Sesame Street song, don't "go together," especially when
the topic is preserving confidences.
2 6
124. Id.
125. See Swindler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 406 (1998)
(holding that the attorney-client privilege survives the death of the client).
126. Fox Remarks, supra note 6.
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Transactional lawyers, however, advise their clients all the
time with respect to materiality in securities filings, and often
are ready to resign if there is serious disagreement with a cli-
ent about whether information is material enough to be dis-
closed. Here, however, the issue is disclosure only to the audi-
tors, who in turn must decide if the information is material to
the client's financial statements and, under the 1995 Act,
whether an illegal act has occurred that must be disclosed.
127
The difficult decision thus lies with the auditors, not the law-
yers. When lawyers represent a client that has voluntarily
waived secrecy with respect to communications with its audi-
tors, it is not unreasonable, or particularly difficult, for the
lawyers to disclose to the auditors information that might be
material to the job that the auditors were hired to do.
Far from undermining the values of the legal profession, ex
ante waiver of client confidentiality in lawyer communications
with auditors helps avoid inconsistencies in the rules of the le-
gal profession. A firm that receives a prospective waiver has
contracted around the arguable inconsistency between Model
Rule 1.6 and similar rules prohibiting disclosure of client confi-
dences except in the narrowest of circumstances, 128 and Model
Rule 1.2 prohibiting lawyer assistance of client crime or
fraud.129 Although it is possible to avoid assisting a client's
crime or fraud without disclosing it, many lawyers do not real-
ize how a corrupt client has used their services until it is too
late, and disclosure to auditors is often the easiest way to pre-
vent, or at least mitigate the effects of, the client's actions.
I Particularly in view of ambiguity in the bar's own rules in
the crime or fraud situation (and the fact that a majority of
states have rejected the restrictive disclosure rules in Model
Rule 1.6), it seems unreasonable for the bar to prevent lawyers
from voluntarily assuming the responsibility of communicating
with auditors on behalf of clients who have voluntarily asked
them to do so. The possibility of a voluntary disclosure regime
in which lawyers and clients could mutually agree ex ante to
lawyer disclosure of confidences to prevent fraud was raised in
the academic literature five years ago. 130 Now, this possibility
emerges as a market solution to the ethical dilemmas of multi-
disciplinary practice. The most substantial barrier is not the
127. See supra text accompanying notes 55-59.
128. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1983).
129. See, e.g., id. Rule 1.2(d).
130. See generally Painter, supra note 11.
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disciplinary practice. The most substantial barrier is not the
question of whether lawyers and clients will agree to this solu-
tion, but the question of whether the organized bar will allow
it. 131
2. Perverse Economic Incentives from Multidisciplinary
Practice
A more serious concern is that prospective waiver of client
confidences simply will not work because multidisciplinary
practice reinforces with rational economic incentives the al-
ready existing psychological biases in favor of risk taking and
concealment. Arguably, any arrangement in which lawyers
and auditors within the same firm represent a client simulta-
neously sacrifices auditor independence because the firm re-
ceives compensation for legal as well as auditing services. If a
substantial portion of the firm's billings from a single client are
attributable to legal services, the firm's auditors could be pres-
sured by their lawyer colleagues not to comply with the audi-
tors' obligation to disclose illegal acts or fraud. Instead of the
auditors convincing the lawyers to play by their rules, everyone
could end up playing by the lawyers' rules.
This scenario is possible, but not very likely. An auditing
firm's most valuable asset is usually its reputation, and an
auditor who would not jeopardize his firm's reputation in re-
turn for an auditing fee probably would not change his mind
merely because his firm was earning a legal fee from the same
client. Most lawyers also would think twice before pressuring
an auditor with whom they share profits, losses and liabilities
to violate an important legal duty. Furthermore, if information
known to lawyers is legally attributable to auditors with whom
they practice, the lawyers have strong incentives to provide ac-
curate information to the auditors. Bringing lawyers into
auditing firms thus enhances the quality of the information
that auditors are likely to receive about their clients, enabling
them to make the required disclosures. While internal lawyer-
auditor communication will differ from firm to firm, communi-
131. It would also be necessary for the SEC to consent to lawyers and ac-
countants in a multidisciplinary setting representing a client at the same
time. Although the SEC at this point appears adamant not to allow lawyers
and auditors in the same firm to represent a client simultaneously, the SEC
might, and probably should, show flexibility if it were clear that lawyers and




cation is likely to be more complete and prompt when lawyers
and auditors practice together than when the more formal and
cumbersome procedure of obtaining auditor letters from outside
law firms is used. On balance, it appears that once a multidis-
ciplinary firm obtains a waiver of confidentiality from a client,
the incentives for the lawyers to disclose material information
to the auditors and for the auditors to disclose more than offset
compensation related incentives for the auditors not to disclose.
Finally, the Big 5 accounting firms already engage in mul-
tidisciplinary practice by frequently providing consulting, ac-
counting and other services in addition to auditing services for
the same client. Adding legal practice to the mix only com-
pounds compensation related incentives that are already there.
Compensation related incentives that undermine auditor inde-
pendence are thus probably best dealt with not by exclusion of
lawyers from multidisciplinary practice, but by (i) requiring
disclosure in a client's securities filings of amounts paid to its
auditing firm that are attributable to nonauditing services, and
perhaps (ii) designation by the SEC of a percentage of total
compensation attributable to nonauditing services-whether
legal, accounting or consulting services-that an auditing firm
receives from a single client, above which the auditors will no
longer be considered independent.
CONCLUSION
Lawyers' rules for disclosure of client crime and fraud are
particularly inept at facilitating a risk averse response to the
situation in which a lawyer and his client are most likely to act
in a risk preferring manner-the loss frame in which the client
is in financial trouble or has already violated the law. Auditors'
rules allow less flexibility in responding to the situation, but for
this reason are more effective than lawyers' rules at overcom-
ing psychological bias toward risk taking that is unlikely to be
in the client's or the professional's best interest.
Far from undermining the values of the legal profession,
prospective waiver by sophisticated clients of lawyer secrecy
rules for communications with auditors strengthens these val-
ues by alleviating tension between conflicting values. The firm
that receives the waiver no longer has to agonize over apparent
inconsistency between rules that prohibit lawyer facilitation of
crime or fraud and rules that prohibit lawyer disclosure of con-
fidential information. Furthermore, assuming waiver is ob-
tained, the lawyers' liability driven and other incentives to dis-
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close material information about a client to their auditor part-
ners and the auditors' incentives to compel disclosure by the
client, should more than offset compensation related incentives
the lawyers and auditors could have not to disclose. Finally, if
the confidentiality waiver is obtained before a loss frame arises,
and lawyers and auditors in the same firm make some effort to
check each other's evaluations of the client, progress may be
made toward overcoming psychological bias toward excessive
risk taking when a client is in trouble.
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